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Contributory Negligence of Automobile
Passengers
Martin C. Spector*

W

of a passenger when the auto in which he
is riding is approaching a railroad crossing, or an intersection, or when the auto is going at an excessive rate of speed,
or if the driver is intoxicated? When does the passenger have a
duty to remonstrate with the driver and when may he rely on
the skill and care of the driver? May the contributory negligence
of the driver be imputed to the passenger? Note that this article
deals with contributory negligence as such, and does not attempt to distinguish between results in guest statute or nonguest-statute situations.
An invited guest is not to be supine and inert as mere
freight. Accepting the hospitality of his friend does not excuse him from the duty of acting for his own safety as a
reasonably prudent person would under like circumstances.'
HAT IS THE DUTY

Railroad Crossing
When a train is approaching, the traveler must look attentively and effectively up and down the track before attempting
to cross. The traveler is chargeable with what he could have
seen had he so looked and with hearing what he would have
heard had he so listened. In other words, where he looks and
listens but does not see or hear the approaching train which is
in full view, it will be presumed that he did not look or listen at
all or, if he did, that he did not heed what he saw or heard. Such
a rule is predicated upon the assumption that by the exercise of
ordinary care, the effective use of his senses, he could have seen
2
the approaching train which was in full view or plainly visible.
The rule which charges the traveler with seeing what he
could have seen if he had looked and with hearing what he could
have heard if he had listened is without application where it cannot be said as a matter of law that the traveler is presumed to
have seen the locomotive. The question of contributory negli* B.S., Kent State University, Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall
Law School.
1 Koster v. Matson, 139 Kan. 124, 30 P. 2d 107, 111 (1934).
2 Stowers v. Union Pac. R. Co., 72 Idaho 87, 237 P. 2d 1041 (1951).
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gence cannot be withdrawn from the jury where vision is im3
paired by darkness.
When the passenger testified that he was watching for the
train and that the truck in which he was riding was traveling
at a low rate of speed and could have stopped at any time during
its immediate approach to the crossing, the passenger was bound
to see the plainly visible train. 4 When the passenger is charged
with knowledge of an approaching train, it is his duty to warn
the driver or to take other appropriate action to avoid injury.5
The passenger's failure to act constitutes contributory negligence.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, an occupant of
an automobile will be presumed to have exercised ordinary care
for his own safety. When undisputed evidence indicates that the
occupant could have seen or heard the approaching train if he
had looked or listened, the presumption is rebutted and the occupant will be held contributorily negligent as a matter of law.6
In the recent California case of Pober v. Western Pacific Railroad Company7 the driver of an automobile approaching a railroad crossing ignored a reflectorized railroad warning sign, two
white RxR's painted on the street about 200 feet in advance of
the crossing, and double white lines parallel to and in advance of
the tracks; and in complete disregard of two crossing signs, the
highly visible nature of the silver and orange colored engine of
the defendant, the large headlight of the engine, and two blasts
of the whistle, so operated the automobile that it crashed into
the train. The driver made no attempt to stop, swerve, or
otherwise avoid the accident. There was evidence that the driver
was intoxicated at the time of the accident.
The court held that the passenger is bound to exercise ordinary care for his own safety. In approaching a place of danger,
the passenger may not shut his eyes to an obvious danger and
rely blindly on the driver. The extent of his duty depends on
the particular circumstances and ordinarily is a question of fact
s Hendrickson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 170 Minn. 394, 212 N. W. 600

(1927); Miller v. Manistique and L. S. Ry. Co., 234 Mich. 184, 207 N. W. 809

(1926).

Yearout v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific R. Co., 82 Idaho 466,
354 P. 2d 759 (1960); Stowers v. Union Pac. R. Co., supra n. 2.
5 Yearout v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific R. Co., supra n. 4.
6 Gilkersen v. Baltimore and Ohio R. Co., 129 W. Va. 649, 41 S. E. 2d 188
(1946).
7 55 Cal. 2d 314, 11 Cal. Rptr. 106, 359 P. 2d 474 (1961).
4
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for the jury; but the passenger is normally bound to protest
against actual negligence or recklessness of the driver."
When the passenger is aware that the driver is violating the
law, not looking for trains, or is driving in a negligent manner, or
that an engine or train is approaching on the tracks and is so
close as to constitute an immediate threat to those in the vehicle,
the passenger has the duty of doing whatever an ordinary prudent person would do under the same circumstances to warn or
inform the driver in an effort to prevent a collision.9
The only time when there is not at least a question of fact
as to the passenger's contributory negligence is when he is unaware that the driver is carelessly rushing into danger.' 0 Failure
of the passenger to observe the condition of the traffic on the
highway without any fact brought to his attention which would
cause a person of ordinary prudence to act will not support a
finding of contributory negligence."
The mere fact that an automobile is approaching a railroad
track does not place a burden on a guest to ascertain whether or
not a train is approaching, 12 but an approach to a railroad crossing is in itself a warning of danger of which the traveler is bound
13
to take notice.
Thus, if a car approaches a railroad crossing and the driver
slows down as he nears the tracks and appears to fully perceive
the conditions along the railroad track, and there is nothing to
cause the passenger to remonstrate with the driver, then the
guest has no burden to ascertain if a train is approaching: The
approach to a railroad crossing is a warning of danger which
means that the passenger should at least observe that the driver
is taking the necessary precautions for their safety.
8 Parker v. Southern Pacific Co., 204 Cal. 609, 269 P. 622 (1928); Miller v.

Atchison T. and S. F. Ry. Co., 166 Cal. App. 2d 160, 332 P. 2d 746 (1958);
Miller v. Western Pacific Railroad Company, 24 Cal. Rptr. 785 (Cal. App.
1962).
9 Pobor v. Western Pacific Railroad Company, supra n. 7; Miller v. Western
Pacific Railroad Company, supra n. 8; Cate v. Fresno Traction Co., 213 Cal.
190, 2 P. 2d 364 (1931).
10 Pobor v. Western Pacific Railroad Company, supra n. 7; Miller v. Western
Pacific Railroad Company, supra n. 8; Thompson v. Los Angeles, etc. Ry.
Co., 165 Cal. 748, 134 P. 709 (1913); Gadbury v. Ray, 171 Cal. App. 2d 150,
340 P. 2d 66 (1959).
11 Robinson v. Cable, 55 Cal. 2d 425, 11 Cal. Rptr. 377, 359 P. 2d 929 (1961).
12 Klein v. Southern Pacific Company, 21 Cal. Rptr. 233 (Cal. App. 1962).
13 Parker v. Southern Pacific Company, supra n. 8; Miller v. Western Pacific Railroad Company, supra n. 8; Pobor v. Western Pacific Railroad Company, supra n. 7.
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Intoxication
When a guest passenger voluntarily rides with a driver who
is intoxicated to a point which seriously affects his ability to
drive safely, and the driver's condition is known or should have
been known to the guest passenger, this constitutes independent
contributory negligence of the passenger which is sufficient to
bar his recovery for injuries sustained in any case where the
14
driver's negligence is the proximate cause of an accident.
15
Taylor v. Birks was an action for personal injuries sustained by a sleeping, intoxicated guest when the car in which he
was riding hit a telephone pole while the automobile was traveling at a high and reckless speed. The driver of the automobile
was sober and had insisted on taking the guest home because of
the guest's intoxicated condition.
The court held that the guest was not guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. Since the plaintiff became intoxicated before he became a guest, he had no way of anticipating
that he would become a passenger in the defendant's automobile.
The defendant was not allowed to rely on a defense which he had
created by insisting that the guest go home with him.
Speed
The duty of the guest is to remonstrate with the driver if a
reasonably prudent person would have done so under like circumstances; but the guest will not be held guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law for failing to warn the driver that
the car is being driven above the speed limit. 16
In Bell v. Maxwell 17 the passenger got out of the car after
the driver had been going at excessive speeds, and then got back
into the automobile when the driver told the guest he would
drive at a normal rate of speed. It was held to be a question for
the jury as to whether the passenger was contributorily negligent.
The guest who feels himself in danger of great bodily harm
due to the excessive speed of the vehicle in which he is riding
14 Otis v. New Orleans Public Service, 127 So. 2d 197 (La. App. 1961);
Cowan v. Bunce, 27 Cal. Rptr. 758 (Cal. App. 1963).
15 325 P. 2d 737 (Okla. 1958).
16 Mills v. Southwest Builders, Inc., 70 N. M. 407, 374 P. 2d 289 (1962);
Bradbeer v. Scott, 193 Cal. App. 2d 754, 14 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1961).
17 246 N. C. 257, 98 S. E. 2d 33 (1957).
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is not ordinarily expected to leap from the vehicle while it is
still in rapid motion. The guest may have a duty to leave the
car if there is a reasonable opportunity to do so, if a person in
the exercise of ordinary care would have done so under the
same or similar circumstances.'
A passenger in an automobile was barred from recovering
damages for personal injuries as a matter of law in Bogen v.
Bogen. 19 In this case the defendant husband did not tell the
plaintiff wife to get back in the car, or that his reckless driving
and excessive speeding was over.
When the driver is recklessly rushing on at a dangerous rate
of speed, and the guest, knowing the danger, sits silent and fails
to protest or remonstrate, he assumes the risk of injury. A person is precluded from recovery for an injury when he is aware
of the danger and understands the risk, and voluntarily exposes
himself to the possibility of bodily harm. 20 The occupant may not
abandon the exercise of his own faculties and absolutely entrust
his safety to the driver in the face of imminent danger or where
there is manifestly lack of ordinary care on the part of the
21
driver.
A passenger is not bound to anticipate the resumption of
reckless driving and does not assume the risk involved when,
after the passenger's protest of the driver's excessive speed
under dangerous conditions, he commences to drive more care22
fully.
Intersections
A guest may ordinarily rely upon a driver who has exclusive
control of the automobile except in the case of visible lack of
caution or known imminence of danger, when it becomes the duty
of the guest to take such action as an ordinary prudent and
23
careful person would take under similar circumstances.
18 Bell v. Maxwell, supra n. 17.
'9 220 N. C. 648, 18 S. E. 2d 162 (1942).
20 Koster v. Matson, supra n. 1.
21 Lorrance v. Smith, 173 La. 883, 138 So. 871 (1931).
22 Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. of Indiana v. Seal, 179 N. E. 2d 760
(Ind. App. 1962).
23 Lamfers v. Licklider, 332 S. W. 2d 882 (Mo. 1960); Brooks v. Mock, 330
S. W. 2d 759 (Mo. 1959); Robinson v. Cable, supra n. 11; Van Pelt v. Carte,
26 Cal. Rptr. 182 (Cal. App. 1962); Dashnow v. Myers, 121 Vt. 273, 155 A.
2d 859 (1959).
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The driver of an automobile synchronizes his speed to
the time, place, and duration of his own observation and not
to that of his passenger. The passenger not being forewarned as to how the driver of an automobile expects to
operate it in a particular situation is at a disadvantage and
makes his observation under difficulties. It is confusing and
disturbing to a driver of an automobile to have a passenger
suggesting how he shall drive. Unless the passenger sees an
would
obvious danger which the driver might not see, there
24
be no duty on the passenger to warn the driver.
In Mouser v. Talley 25 the plaintiff was a guest in an automobile which stopped at an intersection to make a left hand
turn. After stopping, the driver made his turn and was struck
by another car. During the short period of time between the
starting of the automobile and the collision, one of the passengers
protested.
The court, in discussing plaintiff's duty to remonstrate with
the driver where one of the other passengers in the car protested,
stated that "where one of two or more passengers riding in an
automobile gives timely warning to the driver in an audible voice
of approaching danger, fellow passengers are relieved from any
duty to protest." The court held that there was no contributory
negligence in this case because of the short period of time between the starting of the automobile and the collision with the
oncoming vehicle.
The host's negligence must persist for a long enough period
of time to give the guest an opportunity to protest, or the guest
will be exonerated from contributory negligence in not warning
the driver.

26

In Bernard v. Bohanan27 there was conflicting evidence as
to whether the driver of the automobile stopped at the stop sign
before entering the intersection where there was a collision and
the passenger was injured. The court held that where there was
lack of evidence showing that the motorist was not cautious up
to the moment she entered the intersection, the passenger was
not contributorily negligent as a matter of law although she did
not warn the motorist of the stop sign.
McCormack v. Haan, 30 Ill. App. 2d 311, 174 N. E. 2d 206, 208 (1961).
375 P. 2d 968 (Okla. 1962).
26 Koepke v. Miller et al., 241 Wis. 501, 6 N. W. 2d 670 (1942); Diggs v. Lail,
201 Va. 871, 114 S. E. 2d 743 (1960).
27 203 Va. 372, 124 S. E. 2d 191 (1962).
24
25
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Ordinarily, the passenger has no duty to direct and control
the driver unless it is obvious that the driver is taking no pre28
cautions for their safety.
Vigilance of Passenger
A passenger without some reason to suspect a particular
defect in an automobile has no duty to inspect the automobile
before accepting an invitation to ride in it. 29 Where the passenger did not know that the rear tires of the automobile were slick
and worn, and where there was no evidence of careless and reckless driving of the automobile and no evidence to show that the
passenger in the exercise of due care had reasonable ground to
believe that the rear tires were slick and worn, then there was no
sufficient evidence of contributory negligence for the case to be
submitted to the jury.30
When a passenger becomes aware of a danger, or when he
should be aware of it, he has a duty to exercise ordinary care
for his own safety and to protect himself by giving warning to
the driver. A passenger has no duty to be a lookout for the
driver.8 1 The front seat passenger and the rear seat passenger
ordinarily are burdened with the same duty of personal vigi32
lance.
Where the driver was proceeding along the highway at a
reasonable speed and the guest had observed nothing to cause
her to complain about the way he was driving, the fact that the
guest was sitting with her knees on the seat talking to the driver
and paying no attention to the road ahead or to the driver's
operation of the vehicle does not constitute sufficient evidence
for the submission to the jury of the question of contributory
83
negligence.
Imputing Driver's Contributory Negligence
The contributory negligence of one in charge of or in control
of a train, car, or other vehicle cannot be visited upon a person
who is a passenger therein unless the person so riding has charge
or control of the vehicle or over the person who is driving the
See also Mize v. Gardner Motor Co., 166 Va. 415, 186 S. E. 108 (1936).
Mann v. Bowman Transportation, Inc., 300 F. 2d 505 (4th Cir. 1962).
30 Johnson v. Lewis, 251 N. C. 797, 112 S. E. 2d 512 (1960).
31 Rahja v. Current, 119 N. W. 2d 699 (Minn. 1963).
32 Yarabek v. Brown, 357 Mich. 120, 97 N. W. 2d 797 (1959).
88 Watters v. Parrish, 252 N. C. 787, 115 S. E. 2d 1 (1960).

28
29
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same.34 The passenger may be burdened with his own negligence
when he joins the driver in "testing manifest danger," 3 5 but
ordinarily the negligence of the driver is not imputed to the
30
passenger.
Conclusion
In order for a passenger to recover for injuries sustained
through the negligence of a third party, the passenger must be
free of contributory negligence.
He may be required to take action for his own safety if he
observes that the driver is unfit to operate the vehicle, or if he
observes a danger of which a reasonably prudent person would
warn the driver. A passenger is under no duty to supervise the
driving of the vehicle, nor is he under a duty to maintain an
independent lookout.
The guest will be deemed contributorily negligent where he
has an adequate and proper opportunity to protect his own safety
and when the danger is reasonably manifest to the guest and he
fails to remonstrate with the driver, thus allowing the injury to
occur.
Elyton Land Co. v. Mingea, 89 Ala. 521, 7 So. 666 (1890); Central of
Georgia Ry. Co., 195 Ala. 378, 70 So. 729 (1916).
35 Hardie v. Barrett, 257 Pa. 42, 101 A. 75 (1917).
36 Fisher v. Suko, 111 N. W. 2d 360 (N. D. 1961); Bartek v. Glasers Provision Co., 160 Neb. 794, 71 N. W. 2d 466 (1955); Campbell v. Marquis, 112
Ohio App. 50, 175 N. E. 2d 106 (1960).
34
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